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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Responderi_t, 
-v-
RAYMOND JOE VIGIL, Case No. 18118 
Defendant-Appeilant. 
. BRIEF OF AP.PELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appeilant, Raymond Joe Vigil, appeals from his 
conviction of the crimes of Aggravated Robbery, a first degree 
felony, and Attempted Criminal Homicide, a second degree 
felony, and the judgments thereof in the District Court of the 
Third Judicial District, in and for the County of Salt Lake, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, Raymond Joe Vigil, was tried and convicted 
by a jury of Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, and 
Attempted Criminal Homicide, a second degree felony. Appellant 
was sentenced to an indeterminate term of five years to life, 
and an indeterminate term of one year to five years, such 
sentences to run concurrently. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment rendered by 
the Court below and a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On or about July 26, 1981, at about 10:30 p.m., the 
Winchell's Doughnut Shop loca.ted at 1465 South State 'Street in 
Salt Lake City, Utah, was robbed by two Mexican-American men, 
one of whom carried a firearm. The two men were seen exiting a 
yellow Pinto automobile with Idaho license plates prior to their 
entry into the store.· ·Testimony at trial was that the driver 
of the automobile remained in the car. Some moments later, after 
the incident had been reported to the 'Salt Lake City Police, a 
Salt Lake City Police ·car followed and subsequently pursued a 
yellow Pinto with Idaho license plates being driven by the 
appellant Raymond Joe Vigil, while it was proceeding west on 
17th South Street. The automobile made a right-hand turn onto 
a side street and stopped at the command of the officer. Back-up 
police units then arrived and the officers emerged from the 
police cars with shotguns and service revolvers pointed at the 
Pinto automobile. As one of the occupants of the automobile 
attempted to get out of the car, the officers told all occupants 
to remain in the car. The Pinto then drove away at a high rate 
of speed toward the end of the dead-end street it had entered. 
Two Salt Lake City Police cars then blocked the pathway of the 
-2-
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vehicle. As the vehicle made a U-turn and turned towards the 
police cars, gunfire ensued, the Pinto stopped, and the occupants 
exited the car and fled. The appellant, Raymond Vigil, was 
arrested having been located in a backyard in the general 
vicinity. A gun was located in another yard, and subsequently 
two suspects·, Rudy Duran and Leo Duran, were arrested in the 
vicinity, one ·suspect ·being in possession of money believed to 
have been stoleri from Winchell's .. · At the preliminary hearing of 
the ·three ·defendants·, Rudy Duran and Leo Duran were positively 
identified by the ·employee· of Winchell's Doughnuts as the persons 
who committed the robbery. Appellant was not identified by the 
Winchell's ·employee as having been a participant in the robbery 
nor was the appellant ·identified by a witness in the parking 
lot who claims to have seen three men in the Pinto prior to 
two of the men getting out of the car and going around to the 
front of Winchell's Doughnuts. Prior to the beginning of the 
trial scheduled for all three ·defendants, defendants Leo Duran 
and Rudy Duran, both parolees from the Utah State Prison, entered 
pleas of guilty to Attempted Criminal Homicide, felonies of the 
second degree, as a result of plea negotiations, and were 
sentenced to the ·utah State Prison for terms of from one to 
fifteen years rather than for sentences of from five to life 
as mandated if their pleas had been to the first degree felony 
of Aggravated Robbery. Appellant then stood trial alone. 
Defense ·counsel presented the testimony of Leo Duran, 
who indicated that he and his brother, Rudy, had committed the 
-3-
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armed robbery of Win.chell' s Doughnut shop, after havi~g borrowed 
a car belonging to appellant''S girlfriend. Duran testified 
that after having committed the robbery, they returned to a 
party nearby which was being attended by Mr. Vigil, and asked 
him to accompany them. 'It was after having picked up Mr. Vigil 
that the ·encounter with the police officers occurred. Mr. Duran 
further testified that Mr. Vigil began driving the car after 
he was picked up at the ·party and that he, Mr. Duran, was the 
only person involved in an exchange of gunfire with police 
officers. 
At trial, during closing arguments, defense counsel sought 
to comment about the ·plea_ba~gain entered into by the Durans 
insofar as it affected the evidence against the appellant. The 
prosecutor· obj e·cted to this ·line of argument and was sustained. 
Then, in rebuttal, .the prosecutor commented on the same plea 
bargain stating that, because a guilty plea had been entered, 
that the jury could consider that as an admission of guilt; that 
such a crime was in fact committed. Defense counsel objected 
and was overruled. Counsel then made a motion for a mistrial 
based on the prose·cutor • s argument which was denied. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CO:MMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY 
ALLOWING THE PROSECUTOR TO COMMENT ON THE GUILTY 
PLEA OF THE CO-DEFENDANTS WHILE NOT ALLOWING 
THE DEFENSE COUNSEL TO ALSO COMMENT ON THE PLEA. 
-4-
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Evidence of a plea ba:r-gain was brought out at trial by 
the testimony of· Leo Duran. He ·testified that he and Rudy Duran 
accepted a plea bargain wherein they would plead. guilty to the 
second degree felony, Attempted Criminal Homicide, and in doing 
so, the first degree ·felony Aggravated Robbery would be dropped. 
In State ·v. Va'ldez·,· 30 Utah ·2d 54, 513 P.2d 422 (1973), 
the Utah court discussed the r~ght of both sides to argue the 
evidence 'from their respective ·standpoints:· 
Counsel for both sides· have considerable 
latitude ·in their arguments to the jury; 
they have ·a rightto discuss fully from 
their standpoints the ·evidence and the 
inferences and deductions arising there-
from. The ·tes·t of whether the remarks 
made by counsel are ·so objectionable as 
to merit a reversal in a criminal case 
is, did the reniarks call to the ·attention 
of the jurors matters which they would 
not be justified in considering in deter-
mining their verdict, and were they, under 
the circumstances· of the ·particular case, 
probably influenced by those remarks. The 
determination of' whether the improper re-
marks have influenced a verdict is within 
the sound discretion of the 'trial court 
on motion for a new trial. 513 P.2d at 
426. 
This view was re-emphasized in State v. Gaxiola, 550 P.2d 
1298, 1301 (Utah 1976). In Gaxiola, the prosecutor's statements 
were found to be ·in response· to the strong advocacy of defense 
counsel in his closing argument, and were within the range of 
reasonable inferences which could be drawn from the evidence. 
In the instant case, defense counsel was prevented from 
commenting as to the ·plea bargain entered into by the Durans, as 
testified to by Leo Duran. Appellant stood trial alone after the 
-5-
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pleas taken by the Durans, even though he was also offered the 
. - -
opportunity to enter a plea of guilty to the second degree offense 
of Attempted Criminal Homicide.· Therefore, the· circumstances 
leading up to the ·pleas of the Durans with ·the resulting sen-
tencing ramifications were ·definitely important factors bearing 
on the ·appellant's stance at his trial. 
Charged with Aggravated Robbery and Attempted Criminal 
Homicide,· the ·nurans pled. guilty to the ·1atter charge, a second 
degree felony. ·It was obvious from the testimony of Leo Duran 
that he ·and Rudy Duran had committed the armed robbery yet a plea 
was offered and accep.ted res.ulting in the dismissal of the first 
degree ·felony charge altogether. It is perfectly reasonable to 
assume,· and from a defense point of view, a reasonable inference 
and deduction to be ·drawn, that the plea bargain was accepted by 
the ·Durans because 'the· Aggravated Robbery, the first degree felony, 
would be dismissed, resulting in the lesser maximum penalty of from 
1 to 15 years. Considering the evidence against the Durans, 
having the ·first degree felony dismissed was certainly a bargain. 
More importantly, considering the lack of evidence against the 
appellant for the robbery and the disputed facts regarding the 
Attempted Criminal Homicide, defendant's. right to explain the 
ramifications ·of the plea bargain in closing was very important. 
Defense· counse·l should have been allowed to tell the jury how 
those "pleas affected the evidenc~ or lack of evidence, against the 
appellant .. · This turns out to be most important in light of the 
prosecutor•s subsequent comments. 
Va1dez· 'states that both sides have the right to argue 
fully the ·evidence ·and the inferences and deductions arising 
~ 
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therefrom. This means defense counsel had the r~ght to alert 
the jury as to the ·motivation· the Durans had in entering the 
guilty plea. Without such an explanation, the jury might well 
think the guilty plea only meant they were undoubtedly guilty. 
This is mis leading and may we·11 have ·influenced the verdict 
against the ·appellant. ·Appellant 'had the right to inform the 
jury that othe·r reasons may well have prompted the plea such 
as the: ·assurance ·that the Durans would not be facing a conviction 
for a first ·degree 'felony. 
It is common knowledge ·that plea bargains are offered 
to defendants not because ·the "State is benevolent and forgiving, 
but because of weaknesses or -.problem in the case. If the State 
h~d a strong case against ·each of the defendants charged, it 
pres·umably would not have ·made such an offer. Dismissal of a 
first degree· ·felony is a significant gesture. 
The prosecutor's comment did exactly what Valdez cautions 
against. By commenting that the plea meant the crime had in 
fact beeri committed, that remark called to the jurors' attention 
a matter which was not necessarily justified, and which probably 
influenced their decision in assessing the evidence against the 
appellant -- the same ·evidence that prompted the State to offer 
a plea and drop the Aggravated Robbery charge. By allowing the 
prosecutor to make this comment, and not allowing defense counse 1 
to comment regarding another inference or deduction that could 
be drawn from the· plea, the court committed reversible error 
causing preJudice to appellant. 
-7-
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In Lewis v.· State, 569 P.2d 486, 489 (Okla. 1977), 
defendants' conviction was reversed because the ·prosecutor 
sugges.ted, among other thi~gs, that the mere ·fact that the 
defendants had the stol~ri credit cards in their posse~sion or 





prose·cutor neglected to include other portions of the applicable ::: 
rule of law that would have clarified his misstatement. Lewis 
is analogous ·to the ·pres·ent situation. Here, the prosecutor 
sugges.ted to the jury that the guilty plea was conclusive that 
the crime had been committed. He neglected to tell the jury about 
the ·ramifications of. the Durans' res.pective pleas. In effect, he 
misstated what the 'plea really meant.· Defense counsel attempted 
to insure· ·that the jury was fully informed but was prevented 
from doing so. ·The prose·cutor cannot be blamed for hes~tating 
to make ·a defense~oriented statement, but defense counsel was 
perfectly willing -- and should have been allowed .__ to present 
the reasonable deduction arising from Leo Duran's testimony 
about the ·guilty plea. 
Othe·r courts have spoken on the importance of fair 
arguments. InHafen·v. p·e·aple, 492 P.2d 847 (Colo. 1970), 
the 'district attorney's remarks were found to be a fair response 
to defense counsel's. arguments·. The court said the provoked 
arguments were ·permissible. ·Here, the ·prosecutor's. comment was 
initial, not provoked. Defense ·counse·l was prevented from making 
the ·argument that would have "provoked" the prosecutor's comment. 
In Gr·ee·n:· v. State, 611 P.2d 262 (Okla. 1980), the court 
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evidence and inferences and deductions arising therefrom. 
However, that right does not permit the prosecutor to bolster 
his argumerit by implications which are unsupported by competent 
evidence ·offered at trial. ·Here, the ·prosecutor improperly 
bolstered hfs argument. ·While ·it is true ·that guilty pleas have 
the same effect as an admission of guilt, there was no competent 
evidence :irf this case· .that the Durans pled guilty because they 
admitted the offense. ·The only evidence on the subject was 
Duran's. tes.timony that indicated they pled to get the robbery 
charge ·dropped. 
The jury received only one side of the story in the 
closing arguments. Defense counsel elicited from Leo Duran the 
fact of the ·plea bargain and that the robbery was dismissed. 
This ·was not objectionable. Although the·plea did not involve 
the ·defendant (in fact, he rejected the offer), it nevertheless 
had an effect on the ·evidence the jury considered in convicting 
him. Counsel should have been allowed to incorporate that 
evidence 'into her closing argument and argue the reasonable 
inferences that followed from it. 
If the court was correct in disallowing defense counsel's 
cormnerit, then it erred in allowing the prosecutor to comment on 
the opposing side of the argument. If it was correct in allowing 
the prosecutor's. com.merit, .then it erred in disallowing defense 
counsel's. comment. In either instance, the court erred. 
-9-
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CONCLUS'ION 
Valdez ·allows ·each side ·to argue 'the reasonable inferences 
and deduction·s to be drawn from the ·evidence. Here, defense 
counsel was prevented froni doing so while the prosecutor was 
allowed to cb ·so. The effect was prejudicial because the jury 
heard only the' 'state's. infer'ences and deductions and was prevented 
from hearing the ·defense's. inferences and deductions. The 
obvious error· in this situation mandates that the conviction be 
set aside since the one-·sided comm~nt had an effect on the evidence 
that the jury aniside~fJ"in reaching their verdict. 
DATED this ·t7<0· day of June, 1982. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BROOKE C. WELLS 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
-10-
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